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These are turbulent times. People everywhere are refusing to sub-
mit docilely to, the rule of distant bureaucrats and managers .
cause of a longing for more control over their own lives citizens
are demanding that goverriffnental. institutions and private organiza-
tions be more responsive to their wishes. Undoubtedly this struggle
widl continue during the coming decades and may well intensify .
Many techniques are being employed to render institutions
more considerate of human needs. One weapon Canadians have
deployed effecAively is the vote; in the last few years, eight provin
cial governments have been turned out of office and the federal
government has been severely rebuked. Citizen groups have sprung
up everywhere and, on occasion, as in the Spadina Expressway
battle, have met with astonishing success. Protest marches, con-
sumer boycotts, -mass meetings and publicity campaigns are being
wed to pressure mass institutions in-to being more attuned to the
aspirations of ordinary people .
To assuage, this insatiable appetite for justice, some modem
governments have turned to an old Swedish institution-the om-
budsman.' The five provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick,
uebec, Manitoba -and Alberta have already established such an
office, and the federal government is considering following suit.
The primary function of the ombudsman is to protect ordinary
people frbm the abuse of governmental power. An individual
who feels ill-treated by some government department may com-
p1min to the ombudsman, who may investigate~ his complaint and
suggest a remedy, If -that is warranted. This is a useful instrument
for supervising governmental activity, one that deserves our sup-
port . One problem with it, however, is that, ilike all bureaucracies,
it Will eventually -become overworked -and insensitve. Another
shortcoming of the ombudsman is its unavailability as a check on
private power.
e-
* A. M. Linden, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
'See generally Gellhorn, Ombudsmen and Others (1966) .
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There is no need to despair, however, because tort law may
serve society in much the same way as an ombudsman.' In fact,
tort law may sometimes be more effective in this watchdog role
than the ombudsman. The resources available to, tort law are al-
mostlimitless, for every court and lawyer in the land may be called
upon to participate in this noble work. Moreover, tort law may be
used against private as well as public institutions .
Despite this, some authors are singing a requiem for tort law.'
They allege that it is obsolescent. Social insurance, they claim,
can provide swifter, more efficient and more universal coverage
for those who are injured as a result of the inevitable accidents of
the industrial world. They denigrate the deterren
,
t force of tort
.law -and suggest that the abuse of power should be curbed by
criminal law and administrative regulations . They contend that,
because insurance covers most of these activities, there is rarely
any sting left in tort liability .
It is true that the compensation function of tort law is waning
in importance . New social welfare schemes are gradually render-
ing superfluous the need for tort reparation, at least for economic
losses. Criminal and administrative law can curb deviant conduct
more effectively than civil sanctions . Widespread insurance does
diminish the deterrent force of civil liability . However, this does
not necessarily doom tort law to extinction .
The law of toTts may still serve in the years ahead as an in-
strument of social pressure upon centres of governmental, financial
and intellectual power.' The financial damages awarded against
transgressors are no longer the only deterrent . Bad publicity may be
more important . When a tort suit is launched, the glare of publicity
may be focused upon it . The officials of the defendant government
or company are drawn into the litigation . They are publicly under
attack and are required to justify their conduct and their methods
of operation to the judge and the jury . This can have a salutary
effect, even though the amount of damages they must actually pay
is insignificant .
1 . The Tort Action and the Publicity Sanction.
By means of a tort suit, an injured individual may be able to . direct
unfavourable publicity against a tortfeasor.' The use of this pub-
' See generally Linden, Canadian Negligence Law (1972), p. 493.
'For example, see Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law
(1970) ; Ison, The Forensic Lottery (1967) .
' See generally Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts : Vistas for the 70's
(1970), 22 Stan . L. Rev. 330.
'See Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal Sanction Against Busi-
ness Corporations (1971), 8 Melb . U. L. Rev. 107; Rourke, Law Enforce-
ment Through Publicity (1957), 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 225.
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licity sanction may have three effects. First, the adverse publicity
can cost the defendant money. The amount involved may be far
in excess of any possible damage award. For example, when Coca-
cola is sued as a result of an exploding coke bottle, this fact may
be broadcast to miffions of potential customers, some of whom
may switch to Pepsi-cola or orange juice. Sales of coke and other
soft drinks will shrink and profits may sink. Even If the. impact of
this un-favourable publicity is only temporary, the cost to the
company can be. substandal. When Air Canada is sued because
of an air crash, some passengers may choose to travel on other
airlines or go by train. When an action is launched against a
particular doctor orhospital, some patients may turn to other doc-
tors or hospitals for their medical care .
Another way in which negative publicity causes financial loss
its through diminution in the value of corporate shares . For ex-
ample, when Richardson-Merrell, the producer of thalidomide
and Mer/29, was sued by hundreds of people injured by these
products, the value of its stock, which had been selling at twenty-
five to thirty-five times its earnings, plunged to fifteen to twenty
times its earnings. In other words, the paper value of the shares
fell to almost half . The shareholders suffered enormous financial
losses, hargely because investors feared that the numerous law suits
against the company might bankrupt it . Actually, these law suits
hardly impaired the financial security of the company. Indeed,
some stockbrokers, at the height of the scare, were suggesting to
their clients that they would be wise to buy Richardson-Merrell
stocks at the abnormafly low prices .
The second effect of the publicity sanction is that it brings
about aloss of prestige. Of course, this may also result in monetary
loss, but it is important for its own sake . Even the managers of
modem corporations are -anxious to be held high in public esteem . .
They want to be proud of their company. Businesses spend mil-
lions on public relations campaigns to shine their corporate images .
A much-publicized civil suit may tamish a ca~npany's reputation
for quali-ty goods and service. It is, therefore, to be avoided at
all
costs. The repair of a damaged corporate reputation may require
a great deal of money, time and effort, that might be used more
prpfitably elsewhere.
Third, harmful publicity may also induce governmental inter-
vention. Tbis~ is something that most businesses and enterprise's
would prefer to avoid, if they possibly could. Nevertheless, if an
action is brought againstan organization engaged in some danger-
ous activity, the attention of governmental officials may be at-
tracted to it . This may trigger a criminal prosecution or an
administrative isanction. If the government agency has no authority
to doanything, public opinion may be stirred up to such an extent
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that the politicians may be forced to -enact new legislation to con-
tral the -perceived abuse. Thus, a tort action may lead tc) the
creation of new regulatory schemes .
It -is difficult to measure the power of the publicity sanction.
It depends for its impact upon the reaction of individuals to in-
formation, something that is difficult to fathom. This is both a
weakness and a strength. It is a weakness because there is no way
of insuring that a tort suit will receiveany mediaattention at all.
In fact, most ordinary law suitsdo not attractany publicity. More-
over, the public may not think that the challenged conduct is very
reprehensible. If this is the case, no one's conduct will be affected
and public officials will not be spurred to, action . Furthermore,
some defendants, like -a monopoly or a governmental -agency, may
beable to withstand some bad publicity, without being badly maul-
ed. Other defendants may minimize the force of negative publicity
by launching a counter-publicity campaign. Such a manoeuvre
was employed by General Motorsafter the much-publicized United
States Senate bearings about automobile safety in the mid-1960's.
Afterit was shown how neglectful they were about auto safety,
General Motorstried to convince the public, with their "Mark of
Excellence' advertising, that their products were unimpeachable.
In some ways the indefinite nature of the publicity sanction
may render it more powerful than -a criminal prosecution or a civil
suit . This is so because the amount of penal fines and damage
awards are often easy to forecast, whereas the result of bad pub-
licity is nearly impossible to prophosy . Some civil trials may drag
on for weeks oreven months under the glare of publicity. News-
papers, magazines, radio and television may give great coverage
to the story. Politicians may be drawn into the fray . The defendant
may be put out of business . It is no small wonder that corporate
managers seem more concerned with the effect of negative pub-
licity arising from law suits against them than they are about the
actual penalties provided for by the law.
Perhaps the most advantageous -aspect of the publicity sanction
is that it is in the hands of ordinary citizens . It is both triggered
by ordinary citizens and imposed by them . Thus anyone who feels
injured bv someone else may institute civil proceedings. He does
not have to wait for isome prosecutor or civil servant to take up
his cause. Too often such public servants are reluctant to move .
They mav have only limited resources attheir command. Politics
may be involved . An aggrieved individual, however, labours under
no such burden ; he can unilaterally commence proceedingsat -any
time, even if his case is by no means iron-clad.
Because of the ease with which civil litigation may be started,
there is a danger of unfounded legal attacks. upon innocent de-
fendants . This hazard is minimized in several ways . First, totally
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unfounded actions may be struck out at the .pleading stage . More-
over, an action properly pleaded may be. dismissed -at the trial
before the defendant actually has to call evidence, if the plaintiff's
evidence does not support the facts he has pleaded. Second, the
technique of awarding costs against the losing side -in litigation is
a deterrent to spurious claims. Most claimants will not lightly
undertake a law suit because, if they lose, it could cost them dear-
ly . Third, the vexatious proceedings legislation may be used to
deny access to. the courts to. some irresponsible persons. These
measures do not remove, the problem altogether, of course, but
they do reduce it .
The application of the publicity sanction is also in the hands
of ordinary citizens . Offenders are not jailed, nor do they lose their
licences . If the people are repulsed by the conduct of the defen
dant they will change~ their purchasing habits and their attitudes .
If they do not feel that anything seriously wrong has been done,
they will not alter their conduct and the publicity sanction will. be
no sanction at all.
11 . The Watchdog Function in Operation.
A tort suit can challenge the decision-making power of the omni-
potent and omnipresent managers of modern society. In a world
dominated increasingly by distant, elite decision-makers, this
watchdog role is becoming more and more necossary . What has
happened in the field of products liability is worth examining in
this context.' Ordinary citizens have rendered accountable many
manufacturers of shoddy goods, particularly in the United States,
where -thousands of tort suits are brought every year. For example,
as a result of tort litigation, the producers of the thalidomide. drug
paid millions of dollars to the children their drug deformed. Al-
though most claims never actually came to a trial on the raerits,
there was much public discussion of them . Many of the executive
officers of the -company had to spend many hours examining their
practices, engaging in discussions with lawyers, and justifying their
stewardship to their shareholders . It was tort law, not the adminis-
trative or the criminal process, that challenged the conduct of the
drug company. In the same way, food processers. and home build-
ers may be called .to account.
Similarly, the manufacturers of defective automobiles have had
to compensate thousands of motorists injured by their substandard
pro-ducts over the last few years. When someone is injured as a
result of a wheel flying off or as a result of a steering failure, the
manufacturers of the -substandard vehicle. may be required to ex-
plain why this happened in -a tort suit . A spotlight may be directed
I See generally Linden, op . cit ., footnote 2, p. 382.
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at their production methods and their testing procedures . Not only
the negligent production but the negligent design of an automobile
may come under judicial scrutiny . If the roof of an automobile
collapses in a collision, if a gas tank ruptures causing a fire, or if
a steering assembly is not crash worthy, a person injured thereby
may commence a tort claim in a court of law against those who
were responsible . A recent Canadian case, Phillips v. Ford Motor
Company,' has indicated that liability may be imposed for a defec-
tive fail-safe system in a ;set of car brakes . One American court
has criticized auto makers for producing cars that crumple like
papier mach6 on impact . It has even been argued, albeit unsuccess-
fully, that a car manufacturer should be liable for building an
automobile that can travel at 115 miles per hour . Although no
damages were awarded the point was seriously considered by the
court in public view . One day someone may try again and meet
with success . Thus, pressure may be applied upon automobile
manufacturers to reconsider their conduct and to justify themselves
to the public.All professional groups come under the aegis of tort law. The
expertise of doctors, lawyers, engineers and accountants may be
impugned in a tort suit. Of course, negligence law normally adopts
as its own thestandards that the professions require of themselves .
But this does not make negligence law redundant, because pro-fe's-
sional groups are less than zealous in policing themselves . Hardly
ever does a doctor., for example, lose his licence to practice medi-
cine because of his incompetence or professional misconduct . It iis
far more common for a physician to be sued by a patient injured
by his malpractice. Consequently, it is the judges, not the College
of Physicians and Surgeons, who by default become regulators of
the quality of medical practice .
The courts can encourage the medical profession to develop
safer procedures. In Chasney v . Anderson' an action was brought
because a child suffocated on a sponge left behind in its throat
after -a tonsillectomy . No sponge count had been done . Nor were
strings attached to the sponges that were used . Still worse, the
search that had been conducted did not discover anything. Liability
was imposed. Following this decision, two articles were written in
the Canadian Medical Association Journal warning doctors about
the need for special precautions in relation to sponges.' It is not
unlikely that these articles, coupled with the publicity in the daily
press at the time, had some impact on the habits of medical men.
There is reason to suspect that, when malprar-tice actions are
7 [19701 2 O.R . 714, rev'd on other grounds, [19711 2 O.R . 637 .
If19501 4 D.L.R . 223 (S.C.C .) -
9 Fisher, The Counting of Sponges (1951), 64 C.M,A .J . 165 ; Lost In-
struments (1952), 66 C.M.A.J . 399 .
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successfully brought against doctors for negligently performing an
operation, administering an anaesthetic or putting on a cast, other
physicians are alerted to the dangers involved in those medical
procedures and the need for utmost care. The impact of these
decisions is amplifted because reports of them are published in the
annual report of the Canadian Medical Protective Association,
something that is received by almost every doctor in Canada. Even
if the law suit is not successful, it wiU still be reported and will
serve to, remind doctorsof the wisdom of caution.
Thus, medical malpractice actions serve a useful function,
dets-pite the fact that doctors do not pay the awards personally . It
is the publicity that carries the sting. However, this sanction is not
as severe on the individual doctor as might be expected. His prac-
tice generally survives, the litigation . In fact, so, small a threat is
tbecivil action to the profossion that the Ontario Committee on
the Healing Arts dismissed it as almost useless in controlling the
quality of medical practice . This body, however, failed to ap-
preciate the educational value of malpractice litigation. No doubt
malpractice actions are a costly and cumbersome way of drama-
tizing the risks of medical practice, but they should provide incen-
tives to, care. True, the medical profession could do a much better
job of regulating the quality of medical practice, if it would exert
itself more inthis area . True, a medical ombudsman would assist
greatly in exposing some acts of wrongdoing. In their absence,
however, the malpractice action stands -as a temporary ombuds-
man, constantly reminding doctors of the risks involved in their
acts. Other professional groups are in much the same position as
doctors, and stand to learn in the same way.
Tort law is a useful mechanism -for the control of the police."
There are, of -course, many provisions of the criminal law that
regulate police officers in their relations with citizens. These un
doubtedly provide some control. However, criminal prosecutions
against police officers are -remarkably infrequent . I doubt whether
sufficient supervision of the police is provided by penal sanctions.
To fiH in part the vacuum in police control, a tort action is ayailable
to any individual injured by wrongful police conduct. Thus, when
police officers use firearms during a chase and injure. someone, a
civil suit may be launched against them . In one case," a thief was
shot while being ,chased by a policenian when the gun he was carry-
ing went off accidentally . Liability was imposed. In another case"
"See generally Weiler, The Control of Police Arrest Practices : RefLee-
tions of a Tort Lawyer, in Studies in Canadian Tort Law (1968), p. 416 .
"Beim V. Goyer (1966), 57 D.L.R . (2d) 253 (S.C.C .) ; See McDonald,
Use of Force by Police to Effect Lawful Arrest (1966-67), 9 Crim. L.
Q . 435 .
12 Smythson v. Priestman, [1959] S.C.R . 615 .
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a gun was discharged by a policeman during an automobile chase.
This act injured the driver and ended up in the death of two young
women. Tort suits by the families of the deceased went all the way
to the Supreme -Court of Canada before they were ultimately dis-
missed as against the police officers . However, following the inci-
dent, new, stricter rules for gun use were promulgated. Conse-
quently, it may bethat the tort suit, although not yielding any civil
liability, may have helped in spurring police officialdom to super-
vise more closely the employment of firearms .
Police arrests may also be supervised by tort law. The land-
mark case of Christie v . Leachinsky," for example, remains a
model for civil libertarians . It held that the police ~xe not allowed
to use a phony charge to detain someone. They must tell him the
true reason for his detention and, if they fail to do so, they can be
held civilly responsible. Similarly, a policeman cannot just stop
and question anybody he feels like. If a policeman has no reason-
able grounds upon which to base a decision to restrain him,
a citizen has the right to resist arrest and may be awarded
damages for false imprisonment in a tort suit . Also, the police
must take care that there is sufficient evidence before they arrest
a suspected shopli-fter . An occasional tort suit serves to remind the
police that they are being watched constantly and that, if they do
anything wrong, they may have to answer for it in court. This can-
not help but render the police more sensitive to, the interests of
individuals .
Tort law is also becoming important in overseeing govern-
mental administrators . Governments are, intruding into our lives
more than ever before . Power is being delegated to civil se)rvants
to conduct the multifarious activities of the modern state. One of
the major problems of our time is, who, is going to protect us from
our protectors? Of course, if they do not do a good job they can be
fired or denied advancement. Too often, however, this is an illusory
sanction . Again we must fall back on the civil suit as one technique
of checking the competence of public officials. For example, when
" municipal licence inspector negligently informed the plaintiff that
" certain location was suitable for a car business, when in fact the
zoning regulation prohibited this use of land, he was rendered
civilly liable to the plaintiff who relied an his advice, rented the
land, and conducted the business profitably for a time until he was
forced to move with resulting financial losses." Similarly, when a
clerk at a Registry Office negligently prepares a certificate for a
purchaser which causes economic loss to an encumbrancer, lia-
13 [19471 A.C. 573 .
" Windsor Motors Ltd. v. Corp . of Powell River (1969), 4 D.L.R . (3d)
155, 68 W.W.R, 173 (B.C.C.A .) .
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bility may be imposed." In a recent Ontario, case, Collins v. Hali-
burton Kawartha Pine Ridge Health Unit," the defendant authority
negligently gave the plaintiff notice that his operation constituted
an "offensive trade" under the Public Health Act. When this notice
became public- knowledge andruined the plaintiffs business, be was
held entitled to reimbursement in a tort action -against the defend-
ant. In an English case," damages were granted to a home-owner
in an action against a building inspector of a local council who
negligently approved the house without detecting that it was being
built on an old rubbish tip. Similarly, a negligent inspector of a gas
furnace was held responsible for failing to detect a defect in the
equipment in violation of a statute.' 8 , -
This area of supervision by tort law of administrative and
municipal officials has been considered by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Welbridge Holdings v. Metropolitan Corporation of
Greater Winnipeg." A municipality passed a by-law upon which
a builder relied and spent money -to prepare plans for an apartment
building . When the by-law was declared invalid after an attack by
some rate-payers, the~ builder had to abandon its plans, with con-
sequent financial loss . The builder's action against the municipality,
on the ground that its loss was suffered as a result of the negligent
passage of the by-law, was ultimately dismissed. Mr . Justice
Laskin observed that a municipality could incur liability both in
contract and -in tort during its exercise of "administrative or minis-
terial, or perhaps better categorized as business powers"." How-
ever, where a municipality errs while exercising its "legislative
capacity" or its "quasi-judicial duty", it is immune from civil lia-
bility, even though it acts improperly, in the same way as is, a
provincial legislature or the Parliament of Canada . No duty of care
is owed in such circumstances.
The different roles of tort law and administrative law are de-
lineated in the Welbridge Holdings case . The function of tort law
is to be limited primarily to the review of lesiser officials and the
way in which they conduct ordinary business. It will have little
impact upon the discretionary or quasi-judicial functions of the
more senior civil servants, who will remain -subject only to the usual
administrative remedies . In support of -this view, Mr. Justice
Laskin suggested that "the risk of loss from the exercise of legisla-
tive and adjudicative authority is a general public risk and not one
for which compensation can be supported on the basis of a private
"Ministry of Housing v. Sharp, [19701 2 Q.B, 223 (C.A .) .
[19721 2 O.R . 508.
Dutton v. Bognor Regis Bldg . Co., - 11972] 1 All E.R . 462.
" Ostash v. Sonnenberg (1968), 67 D.L.R. (2d) 3 It (Alta. C.A.) .
" (1972), 22 D.L.R . (3d) 470.
"Ibid., at P. 477.
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duty of
care
. The situation is different where a claim for damages
for negligence is based on acts done in pursuance or in imple-
mentation of legislation or of adjudicative decrees."" Although
such a distinction unquestionably reduces the potential power and
scope of civil suits against public officials, this may be necessary
for the smooth funotionmg of the bureaucracy.
Tort law can sometimes be used to do the job of civil servants
if they fail to do it themselves . In other words, if a violator of a
statute is not pursued by those who are in charge of its enforce
ment, he does not necessarily escape soot free ; if he is unlucky
enough to injure an individual by his crimmal. conduct, that person
may launch an action for civil damages against him. In presenting
the tort claim, the fact of a penal violation intay assist the claimant
in recovering damages. This is certainly an indirect way of enforc-
ing the criminal law, but it may spur officials to be more diligent
in the future. Moreover, it may focus attention on the neglect of
public officials to pursue the objectives of the legislature. Perhaps
such action m~ay lead to the supply of additional staff to addmuscle
to the administration of the law. Thus, tort law can be the partner
of criminal and administrative law in encouraging compliance with
their legislative mandates .
1111. Institutional Problems.
The use of tort law as an ombudsman is subject to some institu-
tional limitations. It is by no means an ideal instrument for advo-
cating social reform, even though it can serve that noble goal to
some extent .
One shortcoming of tort law as a weapon for social progress
is that its substantive principles may not yield appropriate solu-
tions to the problems presented to the courts . For example,,a law
suit concerning adefective product may be dismissed on the ground
that no negligence has been proved ; a doctor may be held to have
made only an error in judgment ; and an erroneous arrest by the
police may be found to have been reasonable in the circumstances .
Suchcases may well apply some pressure upon the courts to alter,
amend or expand the rules of tort law, but .our judiciary is still
most reluctant to respond to such invitations. It is an unhappy fact
thatthe common law generally lags behind the popular will .
Paradoxically, the Agidity of the common law may sometimes
foster law reform, rather than impede it . A harsh decision in a
well-publicized, test case may spur legislative reform, whereas a
decision that corresponds with the public's sense of justice may
submerge what may be a rather unsatisfactory state of the law in
a particular area. Consequently, those progressive scholars, who
"Ibid., at pp. 478-479.
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assert,that negligence liability is becoming strict liability as a result
of the use of res ipsa loquitur and such other devices, way be fi, n-
peding rather than accelerating the movement towards greater
control of industry . Legislators may be made to think -that
all is
well, when the actual truth is that aJ1 is not well at all . A plaintiff
who brings a tort case that he loses may be of more help to future
victims of the same conduct than the claimant who is lucky enough
to win his case . A judge who says no may actually do more good
than the judge who says yes.
Another limitation upon this use of tort law stems from the
nature of the judicial process in Canada . Our judges are not free
to decide cases in the way that they, personally, would prefer to
decide them . Stare decisis restricts their creative urges. Their room
for manoeuvre is narrowly circumscribed . This isas it should be,
for we cannot supplant our system of precedent with a regime that
permilts judges to do as they wish . No one could forecast the out-
come of litigation . People would be hesitant to enter into arrange-
ments with others. Like cases would be decided inconsistently,
which, in some ways, is the worst form of injustice . At the higher
levels, however, there is no reason why Canadian appeal courts
must feel bound foreverby the dead hand of the past. TheSupreme
Court of Canada is able to alter its path and it has done so on oo-
casion . These are fast-changing times and the law, if it is to serve
society adequately, -must be able to renew itself.
There are some who question the capacity of judges to make
the expert assessments and the policy decisions that are required
in some of those pioneering cases. Theevidence they receive may
be limited. Theirtraining for this work may be inadequate. There
is force in this argument, but this does not mean that the judges
can never try anything new. It only suggests that they should do
so only rarely and with extreme caution. Let us not forget that the
legislature is -able to undo anything that the judges do, if it dis-
agrees with it . If the judges grappled with some of -these com-
plicated problems occasionally, instead of remaining aloof from
them, they might be -able to -act as a catalyst for the legislatures .
The adversary system is probably not the best way to investi-
gate these problems . Even though the two sides of the case are
presented effectively, there may be more than two views to be con
sidered . As a result, certain information may be withbold from the
court. Some arguments may not be advanced . If tort law is to serve
effectively as an ombudsman in the future, we shall have to provide
for the representation of the public interest in certain legal disputes
of general concern.
The role of thecivil jury must be considered inall this . Many
commentators denigrate the capacity of the civil jury to decide
difficult cases. To me, however, -the idea of review of expert de-
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cisions by laymen is most alluring. It would be difficult to devise
a better way of testing popular support for a legal rule than to
require that it be explained to jurors and then asking them to ap-
ply it in a case that is before them . Juries help, keep the judicial
system limber and responsive to the popular will . In describing
the law to a jury a judge must reconsider it himself, which is an
encouragement to reform if needed . If the law seems too foolish,
the jury may well alter it by stealth, while paying lip service to the
old rules. This is not necessarily a bad thing although, if it becomes
too widespread, the entire legal system would be weakened thereby.
IV . The Economics of Tort Trials .
The economics of tort litigation limits the power of tort law as an
ombudsman. Litigants usually sue for money, not ideals . Lawyers
normally work for fees, not principle. Thus, unless there is a good
chance of winning a substantial award, it is unlikely that civil
litigation will be undertaken . Moreover, if a sensible offer of settle-
ment is made, it will normally be accepted instead of proceeding
to trial. The bother and aggravation of a civil trial also reduceis
the number of participants . Moreover, if the claimant loses the
case he may have to pay legal costs -to the, other side. Recently, a
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case, which was ultimately dis-
missed by the Supreme Court of Canada, expended in the neigh-
borhood of $35,000 .00 in legal costs. The total amount that he
would have won, had he been successful, was only $8,000.00. It
was obvious that he was being motivated by something other than
economic advantage to himself . These simple facts thwart assaults
on the frontiers of tort law.
It is, of course, possible to overcome these economic restraints,
if we wish to do so . One technique that might encourage more test
cases is the contingent fee." This method of financing litigation is
widely used in the United States . Under this system, if the plaintiff
wins his case, his lawyer receives a portion of the award, most
frequently one-third . If the claimant is unsuccessful in his law suit,
the lawyer normally goes without any fee, although be might col-
lect some of the actual expenses . There is reason to believe that
the use of the contingent fee has been a factor in the spectacular
development of tort law in the United States of America. Con-
versely, the absence of thecontingent fee in most Canadian prov-
inces may well have dampened the crusading ardour of counsel.
I do not advocate the contingent fee as a replacement for the
fee-for-service system that is in general use in Canada ; but it should
be available, however, as it is in Manitoba, as an alternative method
"See Williston, The Contingent Fee in Canada (1968), 6 Alta . L. Rev.
184; Radin, Contingent Fees in California (1940), 29 Cal. L. Rev, 587,
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of financing difficult claims . If a lawyer is willing to devote his
energy and time in preparing a novel -case, he should be rewarded
with a larger fee than he would receive if he runs no risk and
merely bills for his work . If an advocate is willing to risk going
without a fee, he should be permitted to, run that risk . The client
is better off, because he does not have to pay his own lawyer if he
loses . Moreover, if the client wins, he is normally happy to share
his good fortune with his lawyer .
Financing litigation in this way may create problems. Some
lawyers might foment law suits and competition for cases might
increase . The cost of litigation may -rise . However, these dangers
can be combatted by strict enforcement of legal ethics. and by full
disclosure of any contingent fee agreements. The approval of the
court in advance might be required, -but, in any event, these ac-
counts should be, taxed in the same way as any other legal bills.
Ombudsman-type law suits may also be nurtured by providing
legal counsel -to those who are interested in bringing one. For ex-
ample, legal aid may be granted to someone who cannot afford to
bring such anaction. Neighbourhood law officesare exposing more
-people -to the avail-abilityof legal services and its potential . Govem-
ment may also appoint consumer advocates, who would be avail-
able to assist ordinary citizens in theirclaims. against the manufac-
turors of products. There is -a growing number of young lawyers,
law teachers and law students who are wiRl ing to help prosecute
test cases, without fees, in the advancement of worthwhile social
causes. It is a safe guess that this type of activity will be increasing
in the years ahead .
V. Ethical Problems.
Inherent in the use, of tort law as an ombudsman are several ethical
problems." The lawyer's prime obligation is to his client . He must
not exploit his clients interests in order to advance what he per-
ceive~s io be the public interest." His crusading spirit must remain
subservient to his client's interests . Tbus, be must fully advise his
client about the chances of success in -any lawsuit that he prose-
cutes ,onhis behalf." If there is no chance of success, he must in-
form his client of this . Indeed, if the -case is a hopeless one, the
lawyer must try to persuade hisclient not to proceed." The client
must be warned abouth-is obligation to pay costs, not only to his
counsel, but to the other partys counsel if the action . i s lost. Never-
tbeless, if the client wishes to proceed, even though his chances of
'3 See generally Orkin, Legal Ethics (1957) .
"See Tucker, . Ethics of Activism (1970), 56 A.B.A .J . 851 .
Orkin, op . cit., footnote 23, p. 78 .
Ibid., p. 79 .
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success are slight, the lawyer is entitled to take the case to court,
for -the lawyer is not the judge of his client's case.
Counsel owes a duty to the court as well as to the client. He
must not abuse its proms by prosecuting totally worthless claims
and he must try to convince his client to desist from bringing such
actions. If he is unsiwoessful in dissuading the client, counsel may
proceed with the litigation, as long as he is not of the certain and
absolute opinion that the case is hopeless, in which case he should
not carry on."'
A lawyer must not be guilty of maintenance or champerty.
Maintenance is the encouragement of a litigant with money or
otherwise by someone who has no interest in the case . Champerty,
on the other hand, is a form of maintenance which occurs when
the person maintaining the other litigant takes as his reward a pcpr-
tion of the property in dispute, as in a ocmtingent fee contract. It
seems that every champerty is a maintenance but not every main-
tenance is a champerty." Lawyers, therefore, cannot enter into
speculative actions in which their fees are to be a share of the pro-
ceeds of an action, and all such contracts are invalid and unenform-
able . It is permissible, however, for a solicitor to agree to take no
fee (or only nominal costs) in the event that he loses an action,
but to charge his regular costs in the case of success." Simil, arly,
it seems proper for a solicitor to advance -money for disbursements
out of hisown pocket or even to takea case without any fee what-
soever on the basis of friendship or charity. Consequently, even the
present rules of ethics permit much leeway for lawyers who want
to engage in ornhudsman-t)rpe law -suits . We may see some loosen-
ing up of these rules in the futumto facilitate further public interest
litigation.
Conclusion .
Without doubt; this ombudsman role, of tort law is. a blunt and
imperfect tool. Other weapons will also be needed to aid citizens
in their straggle for more responsive institutions . But, however
many governmental ombudsmen we appoint, however many crimi-
nal laws we pass, bowever many -administrative regulations we
enact, there will always remain grievances that are unresolved .
The private tort suit is it the service of society as one way of recti-
fying some of these wrongs, or at least of exposing them to public
view. Canadians would be wiseto preserve the historic tort action
as they may yet have need of it .
"In re Cooke (1889), 5 T.L.R . 407, at p. 408 .
11 Orkin, op . cit., footnote 23, p. 156 .
21 Ibid., p . 160 .
